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On the 11th and the 12th of April, a conference in memory and in honor of Paolo Casalegno
(1952-2009) took place at the University of Milan. Paolo Casalegno was one of the wittiest Ita-
lian analytic philosophers and he primary worked within the areas of philosophy of language
and epistemology. His theoretical reflection played an important role in international debates
about central philosophical topics, such as truth, meaning and knowledge. It is sufficient to
take a look at the invited speakers to gain an insight into Casalegno’s wide and deep philoso-
phical contributions. The speakers’ list deserves a great interest, including philosophers such
as Diego Marconi, Paul Boghossian, Timothy Williamson, Alex Orenstein, Igor Douven and
Crispin Wright (the latter wasn’t actually present because of health problems). They were all
object of Casalegno’s criticism and the conference represented an opportunity to reconstruct
and discuss the debates within which they have been playing a leading role. Professor Elisa
Paganini, a member of the organization committee, introduced the conference, underlying at
best its aims and its spirit: “When we decided to organize the conference, we regretted that
he could not be here, that he could not reply to the objections which will be raised, but we
thought that the best way to remember a philosopher is to discuss his ideas and it is with the-
se ideas that we organized this conference.”. Of course, we agree with Elisa Paganini’s words,
thinking that the critical discussion of his thesis would have been appreciated by Casalegno
himself as the greatest acknowledgment of his philosophical work. Anyway, let us add some
personal considerations. Paolo Casalegno was not only a good analytic philosopher, but also
an extraordinary professor, who entered teaching with as much passion as he devoted himself
to research. Having been lucky enough to be his students, we had the opportunity to know
him as a professor and to learn from him. For this reason, we would like to remember him
also for his human approach towards students, an approach that was so equal that made him
able to say (addressing to undergraduates): “Let’s swap our functions! Go to the blackboard
and please explain me what you have studied and I do not know.”.
Diego Marconi
Competence and Normativity
Marconi’s presentation focuses on the debate between Paolo Casalegno and Marconi him-
self, concerning the two notions of semantic normativity and reference and the way they are
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related to each other. It has taken place since Marconi (1997) rejected the idea that the phe-
nomenon of semantic deference could have been used as an argument to support an objective
notion of reference.
Semantic deference is speakers’ disposition to modify their own use of a word W according
to more competent speakers’ use of W. Casalegno (2000) suggests that a coherent account
of competence requires objective reference as its presupposition. The key question is: what
counts for a speaker to be considered more competent than the others? Casalegno answers
that a speaker X is more competent than a speaker Y in the use of the word W if and only if X
is better than Y in applying W to whatever W refers to. This seems to suggest that competence
presupposes reference. But why should we be forced to adopt an objective notion of reference?
Casalegno considers objective reference to be necessary in order to avoid a dangerous vicious
circle.
Let’s think about standard reference rather than objective reference. Reference is then
fixed by communitarian standards. Because of semantic deference, speakers rely on experts
to know what the communitarian standards of reference are. However, communitarian stan-
dards are circularly fixed by the experts. The reason why Marconi thinks there is no circulari-
ty is that the individual expert is indeed just an interpreter of the communitarian standards
whereas the experts collectively determine what the standards are.
The second part of the presentation discusses the alleged incompatibility between objecti-
ve reference and semantic normativity, i.e. the idea that the application of words is governed
by criteria known to, the experts. Marconi (1997) emphasizes the fact that norms must be
applicable or, in other terms, there has to be someone who is in a position to say whether
they are respected or not. However, if we accept an objective notion of reference, we can’t
rule out either a possible situation in which nobody knows whether a certain norm applies
or a possible situation in which the experts are wrong about its conditions of applicability.
The conclusion he draws is that semantic normativity and objective reference can’t be kept
together.
Casalegno’s reply tries to invalidate this result suggesting that it is not required that the
condition of application “can finally and beyond any doubt be determined to hold”: a norm
is applicable if a subject may reasonably believe that the application condition holds. The
main point outlined by Marconi is connected with the adverb “reasonably”. Is it reasonable
for pre-chemistry Earthians to believe that stuff sharing certain macroscopic properties with
the liquid in lakes and rivers also shares its deep nature? What reasons can they provide for
that? If the hidden nature of a substance is unknown, there are no reasons to consider some
macroscopic properties as depending on it. Moreover, sharing the same properties does not
necessary count as “seeming to have” the same nature. Consider the following case: does a
cherry appear to have the same nature as a strawberry tree fruit because they are both red
and ground?
Casalegno (2007) proposes a new perspective to assess the questions at issue. The debate
needs to be reset without implicitly assuming that the meaning of a consists in a nor for its
use. This assumption, in fact, forces us to consider an objective reference theory as a proposal
about the content of such a norm. For example, the meaning of the word “water” is identified
with the norm “Apply ‘water’ to whatever has the same nature as paradigmatic water”. Thus,
the norm is said to be inapplicable (there is a possible situation in which nobody knows its
applicability conditions) and finally dismissed (an inapplicable norm is not a genuine norm).
How can we block this slippery slope? By rejecting its starting point and defending instead a
truth-conditional account of meaning.
According to this perspective, the facts that are supposed to motivate the inapplicability
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of norms in regard to an objectivistic account of reference, e.g. the fact that before chemistry,
nobody could know if a certain liquid was water because nobody knew water’s deep nature,
are simply cases in which we ignore the truth value of some sentences (“This is water”).
Marconi replies that the inapplicability of objectively based norms doesn’t derive from lack
of content or from any indeterminacies of the truth conditions: a norm may have perfectly
determinate content and be inapplicable nevertheless. Consider the following law
(x) (x must serve in the army for one year at age 18)
and suppose that its application depends on Goldbach conjecture G in such a way that the law
applies to males if G is true, to females if G is false. The law’s content and its conditions of
application are both clear (to the extent that the notions of male and female are not regarded
as particularly vague). If we are mathematical objectivists and we believe that G is either
true or false in any case, no indeterminacy of any kind is involved. Despite this, Marconi
highlights that it would be crazy to make such a law about serving in the military because
the law would not be applicable. The conclusion is that a law may have a fully determined
content and be inapplicable for epistemic reasons.
At the end of his talk, Marconi faces one of the most common and convincing argument
in favor of an objective notion of reference. The argument is this: think about the discovery
of water’s composition in 1715 when water was recognized to be H2O. This discovery implied
that there were samples called “water” that had turned out not to be H2O. There are two
possible reactions among language users:
(a) “Well, they were water in the previous sense of ‘water’; now we found reasons to use
‘water’ differently, so we won’t call those samples ‘water’ any longer”.
(b) “So, in spite of appearances, those samples were not water: all along we were wrong in
calling them ‘water’”.
It is generally argued that (b) is a more plausible reaction than (a) but Marconi is inclined
to consider (b) as plausible as (a). The plausibility of (b) is then thought to be a proof of
speakers’ reliance on an objective notion of reference. Speakers believe that they are going
by the objectively based norm. But, Marconi asks, could one believe to be guided by a norm
while he is actually guided by another norm or by no norms at all? He suggests that it could
be the case. Speakers’ beliefs about which norm or criterion they are applying may be false:
the criteria a speaker is really going by may have no connection with the content of the norm
she believes to be guided by.
In conclusion, Marconi’s presentation aims at reconstructing the ten years debate with
Paolo Casalegno, within a perspective that is at the same time historically accurate and
deeply critical. The questions at issue are of primary philosophical importance, lying within
the contemporary debate on an objectivistic approach to meaning come to the fore thanks to
Kripke and Putnam’s theoretical contributions.
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Paul Boghossian
Reasoning and Meaning
In this talk Paul Boghossian replies to the Casalegno’s objections1 to the Inferential Role
Semantic thesis that, more or less, goes like this: “Knowing the meaning of a constant is to
use it according to some rules”. First of all, Boghossian gives a general description of the
problem (using Modus Ponens (MP) rule as example). We do reason according to logical rules,
even if we are unaware of it, and we are perfectly entitled to do so. In fact, when people, that
are unaware of MP, reason in this way:
It rained last night
If it rained last night then the streets are wet.
So, The streets are wet.
they are entitled to do so. But what does it mean that we are entitled to do so and, moreover,
how can we justify our entitlement? Given that we can’t provide a more general justification
that relies on other rules (for, sooner or later, it will appeal to MP again) we face different
positions that seems unlikely. Among them we have the skeptical alternative -we don’t have
any reason at all- or the explanation by means of a sort of “intuition”. Boghossian believes
that the best way to answer this question is to deploy some aspects of the notion of analyticity,
shifting the question into the explanation of how the understanding of a concept might suffice
for the entitlement. In other words: how can the understanding of “it” entitle us to use MP?
This lead us to consider the Inferential Role Semantic account and a weaker version of it:
(A) Infer according to MP is necessary for someone to mean if with “if”.
After having presented his views on the problem, Boghossian turns onto the critics to his
conception developed by Paolo Casalegno and Tim Williamson, highlighting the fact that
they concentrated more on its inferentialist assumption (A) rather than on its thesis (If we
assume that «Inferring according to MP is necessary to have the meaning of “if”», than we
are blindly entitled to reason according to MP).
The first objection concerns Ramanujan inferences. As Casalegno, in the second part
of his article, puts it: “He was often unable to justify [his] conclusions by means of what
most matematician would have regarded as an acceptable proof. [. . . ] I think it could be
wrong to deny that Ramanujan’s blind inferences were blameless”. The answer provided by
Boghossian is simple. For him, Ramanujan was capable to give a sort of justification for his
assertions.
The next point concerns two objections made respectively by Casalegno2 and Tim Wil-
liamson. Both show that it is possible for someone (i.e. Mary and Simon) to use the word
“and” without being able to use the rules associated with the concept, that is conjunction-
elimination and conjunction-introduction. Boghossian’s reply to Casalegno’s objection simply
1(Casalegno2004)
2Mary suffers from a disability: she can use the word “and” to describe complex scenes as “The box is red and
the book is blue” but is unable to perform conjunction elimination and conjunction introduction (for example she is
unable to derive “The box is blue” from the previous sentence.
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claims that Mary does not have the common concept of conjunction. The reply to Williamson’s
objection is more articulated. Let’s see it in detail.
Williamson imagines an expert philosopher of language that, due to his views on seman-
tics and vagueness, assents to all the composed sentences (A and B) that have, at least, one
conjunct whose truth value is indefinite3. It is evident that we can answer to this objection
denying, as with Casalegno’s one, that Simon means conjunction by “and”. But William-
son says: “Once we become aware of Simon’s deviant theory of logic [. . . ] an explanation of
his [strange linguistic behaviour] in terms of linguistic incompetence looks much more less
attractive”.
Boghossian, here, highlights that Simon’s rules are derived from his semantic theories
and, so, they are not “primitively compelling”. Anyway it is possible to describe Simon’s
behaviour in a different way. Let’s consider an example. Einstein claimed that relativity
is a 3-place relation (instead of 2-place relation). Even if we become aware of his reason to
prefer a different theory of “relativity” we can still think that we face a case of disagreement
of meaning4 without deny that “2-placedness was constitutive of the classical notion”.
In the last part of the talk Boghossian tries to reply to the final Casalegno’s observation:
“Does the syllogism in Barbara belongs to our possession conditions for logical constants? [...]
The problem is that we have not been told what sort of data would be relevant to establish
this”.
Boghossian says that we should consider an explicit case in which we try to introduce a
new word in our language by means of a definition “X is Y and Z”. Here we know exactly
what it is constitutive of the word X (that is Y and Z) for we have stipulated it explicitly.
On the other hand, we see that the case of Inferential Role is different because we cannot
think of logical constants as having acquired their definition by stipulation. There is no
behavioural analogue for this case and we don’t have to fall in the trap of thinking so. There
is no possibility of a behavioural reduction of those interesting concepts. The only thing
that can be done is to ask in every specified context “Does this person has the concept of
conjunction even if he refuse to apply (i.e.) conjunction-elimination?” and answer to it in an
intuitively manner.
Bibliography
Casalegno, P. (2004). Logical concepts and logical inferences. Dialectica 58(3), 395–411.
Alex Orenstein
Inscrutability Scrutinezed
Orenstein’s talk deals with a conceptual analysis of Quinian thesis of inscrutability of refe-
rence and indeterminacy of meaning and it aims at facing the question if the former provides
an argument for the latter.
The first part of his talk analyses two different conceptions of reference inscrutability
that are related with theoretical developments starting from Quine (1960). At the beginning
of his reflection, Quine directly connects inscrutability of reference with indeterminacy of
translation. Anyway, in its later forms5 , inscrutability of reference is independent of Quinian
3Simon’s behaviour reflects his will to avoid only falsity.
4Previously Boghossian suggested not to refer to Simon’s case as “linguistic incompetence” but rather as “meaning
change”.
5See (Quine1960) and (Quine1995).
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distinctive account of observation sentences and views of language acquisition.
Let’s add some details to this shifting account of inscrutability. In his later writings, Quine
introduces the proxy function case as an example of the inscrutability of reference. A proxy
function maps objects of one domain onto objects of another. The inscrutability of reference is
said to be supported by the fact that no evidence can determine whether a person is referring
to an object, or to its image under a proxy function.
Imagine a proxy function f which assigns to an object x its mereological cosmic comple-
ments, f (x). For example, f assigns to a rabbit the entire cosmos less the rabbit itself. Then,
consider the sentence
(1) This rabbit is furry.
The sentence (1) can be interpreted about individual rabbits and individual furry things
and it is true iff the individual rabbit which is “this rabbit” assigned interpretation is a mem-
ber of the set of individual furry things. What are the mereological cosmic complements of
these referring portions? Let’s apply function f: it assigns to “this rabbit” the entire cosmos
less this rabbit and assigns to the predicate “is furry” each of the cosmic complements of indi-
vidual furry things. The sentence (1) is true under such an interpretation because the cosmos
less this rabbit is a member of the set of cosmic complements of individual furry things (i.e.
that set includes the cosmic complement of that individual rabbit).
The proxy function case takes an important role in Quine’s defense of the inscrutability of
reference, releasing it from empiricist assumptions. As Orenstein underlines, proxy functions
do not require anything but standard truth conditional semantics. They show that entirely
different objects can fulfill the role of assigning the needed referents, preserving the truth we
are interested in.
The second part of Orenstein’s presentation focuses on indeterminacy of meaning. First
of all, Orenstein highlights the difference between the indeterminacy of reference thesis,
on one hand, and the indeterminacy of meaning claim, on the other: the former applies
to terms while the latter applies to sentences as indissoluble wholes. As a consequent, the
indeterminacy of meaning thesis can be thought as the inability to single out the propositions
expressed by our sentences.
Quine’s account of meaning indeterminacy is based on his famous thought experiment
about radical translation. The conclusion he draws is that there is no good reason to think
that a uniquely correct translation can be provided.
The final part of Orenstein’s presentation is devoted to answer the following question:
does model theoretic inscrutability provide an argument for indeterminacy? Quine’s an-
swer is a negative one. Orenstein considers an argument from inscrutability of reference
to indeterminacy of meaning that he schematically presents as a case of modus tollens:
P1: Expressions don’t have determinate references.
P2: If an expression has a determinate meaning, then it has a determinate reference.
C: Therefore, expressions don’t have determinate meanings.
Why Quine doesn’t accept it? Because according to a Quinian account of meaning as sti-
mulus meaning6, it does not determine reference. Anyway, Orenstein replies, Quine’s account
of meaning is a non-standard one, whose appropriateness has been widely criticized. In Oren-
stein’s opinion, this fact makes Quine’s indeterminacy claim to be significant just in regard
6The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a person is the class of stimuli which would prompt the person’s assent
to it.
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to his own view. However, if we embrace a different conception of meaning, reinterpreting
Quinian meanings like standard ones (i.e. they determines reference), then the argument
P1 – C is sound. Consequently, Orenstein’s suggestion is that indeterminacy follows from
inscrutability.
In conclusion, it is interesting to report the objections that Timothy Williamson proposes
at the end of Orenstein’s presentation. The central one is that there is no way to arrive from
the indeterminacy of words’ reference to the indeterminacy of proposition expressed if we
assume proposition to be simply set of possible worlds. In fact, it is possible to vary words’
reference without varying the proposition expressed. It is one way street from the reference
of the individual words to the proposition expressed, unless you appeal to much stronger
assumptions (for example, a conception of propositions as structured entities).
Orensteins’s reply to Williamson is less than convincing and our impression is that a
deepener reflection about the relationship between the indeterminacy of meaning thesis and
its philosophical assumptions would have been helpful to evaluate Orenstein’s conclusion.
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Igor Douven
The epistemology of conditionals
The first part of Douven’s talk concerns the objections expressed by Paolo Casalegno to the
Rationality Credibility Account (RCA) theory7 in the article “Rational Beliefs and Assertion”.
Douven’s reply to Casalegno’s first objection (the equivocation fallacy regarding the term
“rational” in the argument8) claims that the notion of rationality in Douven’s argument was
a pre-theoretical one, that is, not-bayesian one, and that, anyway, there have been several
attempts to describe that notion in a bayesian way.
7RCA has been defended by Douven expecially in (Douven2006)
8Douven claims that RCA should be considered better than KR (Knowledge Rule) because it can be derived by
two simple and incontrovertible premises. One of them is: “X should ... only if it is rational for X to ...”. Given
the assertion-belief parallel (the Douven’s second simple premise) we can obtain the rule “X should assert ψ only
if it is rational for X to believe ψ. Casalegno (2009) shows that there is an equivocation fallacy regarding the term
“rational” for in the first premise “rational” means pratical rationality (Bayesian) while in the obtained rule it means
a sort of epistemic rationality.
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The reply to the second objection (the “shoot-yourself” argument9) shows that the truth
value of an instance of the general rule “if it is rational to XY , then it is rational to XY to
yourself” depends on how we substitute the terms in it. For example: let’s assume (maybe
on religious grounds) that it can be rational to shoot someone but it is never rational to shoot
yourself. If we apply the previous rule we obtain this sentence: it can be rational to take care
of someone, but that it is never rational to take care of yourself. So, the substitutivity rule
does not indiscriminately hold.
The third Casalegno’s objection emphasizes that the RCA has trouble in explaining why
the question “How do you know?” is a legitimate response to an assertion and that, moreover,
RCA seems to imply that “I just don’t know” is a plausible answer. Here Douven shows that
his original claim was weaker than Casalegno believed. In fact, it was: “RCA does not worse a
job than KA”. Furthermore, it seems fair that we would not blame the speaker for an answer
like: “I don’t know it, but I have excellent reason for believing that it is raining in Paris”.
In the second part of the talk Douven tried to challenge the “standard view” about the epi-
stemology of conditionals, that is, the claim that Stalnaker’s Hypothesis (SH)10 is False and
that Adams Thesis (AT) is True. In fact, given that SH has an absurd trivial consequence (the
probability of a conditional results to be equal to the probability of the consequent regardless
of the antecedent), Adams denied that conditionals express propositions and proposed to in-
terpret Pr(φ → ψ) not as the probability of (φ → ψ) but, instead, as the acceptability of it:
Acc(φ→ ψ) = Pr(ψ|φ).
Douven challenges the thesis using an experiment11 aiming at discover if there are dif-
ferences between the acceptability and the probability of conditionals. The experiment data
shows that Adams Thesis is overall wrong. So we face a dilemma. Philosophers consider AT
true by “intuitions” but empirical works shows that it is false. On the other side, philosophers
consider Stalnaker’s Hypothesis false on the strong basis of triviality argument but empirical
works (Evans, Over, ... ) shows that it is, at least, descriptively true. So, we have to reconsider
the triviality argument. Some authors (Johnson-Laird et al.) claimed that the previous ex-
perimental results are due to the fact that the probability operator “takes narrow scope over
conditionals12” while the acceptability operator does not (similarly to other operator like, for
example, the necessity operator). As things stand we have to reconsider the triviality argu-
ments of SH and, if we do so, we see that is based in a stronger assumption than SH, namely
GSH13 that, unlike SH, has not been intensively tested. Other triviality arguments do not re-
ly on GSH but, rather, on the generally accepted principle IE14. However GSH can be derived
assuming SH and IE and so we only have to care about GSH. Douven tested GSH, as he does
with AT, and the experiment shows that GSH is not descriptively adequate and so does not
hold. Therefore all the triviality arguments rely on a premise that is not descriptively true.
9Douven claims that belief is a species of “assertion to oneself”. And so “If it is rational for you to assert ψ, then a
fortiori it is rational for you to assert ψ to yourself, that is, given the assertion-belief parallel, it is rational for you to
believe ψ”. Casalegno’s objection sounds as follow: “This is like saying that if [...] it is rational for you to shoot, then
a fortiori it is rational for you to shoot yourself. Cfr. (Casalegno2009)
10Stalnaker’s Hypothesis: Pr(φ→ ψ) = Pr(ψ|φ)
11Context: According to a recent report written on the authority of the Dutch government, many primary school
students in the province of Friesland (where many people still mainly speak Frisian) have difficulty with spelling.
Jitske is a student of a primary school somewhere in the Netherlands.
Conditional: If Jitske goes to a Frisian primary school, then she has difficulty with spelling.
How acceptable is this conditional?
12People tend to interpret: “How probable is ψ if φ?” as “(How probable is ψ) if φ?” rather than “How probable is
(ψ if φ)” and, so, asking for the probability of a conditional is like asking for the conditional probability.
13Generalized Stalnaker’s Hypothesis, GSH: Pr(φ→ ψ|χ) = Pr(ψ|φ ∧ χ)
14Import-Export, IE: “«If φ, then if ψ, then χ» and «If φ and ψ, then χ» are logically equivalent”.
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In the end, these are the results for the static part of the epistemology of conditionals: SH
could be true (for the argument that undermines it lies on a false premise) and AT is false.
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Crispin Wright
Notes on Paolo Casalegno’s “The problem of non-conclusiveness”
The last talk of the conference should have been held by Crispin Wright. Unfortunately, he
could not be in Milan due to health problems and his place was taken by Paul Boghossian
(who read the handout sent by Wright) and Timothy Williamson (who commented it). Here
we will expose the handout and then we will give a brief outline of Williamson’s comments on
it.
Crispin Wright’s paper focuses on Paolo Casalegno’s article “The problem of non-conclusiveness15”
in which the author challenges the verificationist thesis, that is the idea that a theory of mea-
ning should be based on the assertibility conditions of a given sentence. Let’s see Casalegno’s
thesis in detail. Consider a characterization of what a conclusive verification is:
(1) We have verified S conclusively means that we have ruled out ever acquiring in the
future new evidence which would entitle us to assert not-S
and an assertibility-condition:
(I) C is an assertibility condition for a thinker X and a sentence S at t iff X accepts:
1 - If C obtains at t, then S is assertible at t
2 - If X believes that C obtains at t, then X will believe that S is assertible at t.
Given that it is always possible that a person X, who at time t is entitled to assert S given
that conditions C hold, at time t’ is not entitled to assert S anymore because of an eventual
information acquired in the while, then the notion of assertibility-condition is, indeed, incon-
clusive16. So, if an assertibility-condition cannot be conclusive, then the whole notion becomes
inconsistent because “to say that C is a non-conclusive assertibility-condition is virtually the
same as saying that C is not an assertibility condition at all”.
Crispin Wright first comment concerns Casalegno’s characterization of conclusive verifi-
cation that he considers unfortunate because it implies an equation between “having a con-
clusive verification” and “being in a position to rule out that it may turn out that one does
not”. Wright’s proposal is to replace it with: “we have verified S conclusively just in case
we have accumulated sufficient evidence e for S of such a kind that we can rule out overri-
ding defeat of e”. Secondly he points out that the alleged claim that the notion of an incon-
clusive assertibility-condition is aporetical does not seem to hold and the reason is that we
characterized it and, therefore, “there has to be some coherent notion of [it]”.
15(Casalegno2002)
16C is inconclusive means that it is possible that at a time t X believes that C and feels entitled to assert S and at
a later time t’ he, because of new informations, no longer believes that at t was the case that S.
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In his article, Casalegno, suggests a new characterization of the notion of assertibility-
conditions:
(1’) If C obtains at t, and circumstances are appropriate, then S is assertible at t.
Then he points out that there are infinite possible circumstances that are not appropriate for
the assertibility of S and that they vary infinitely in kind. The solution one could propose is
this:
Appropriate circumstances obtains for S on the basis of C if:
(I) There is no plausible equally good or better explanation of C, compatible with not-S
(II) There is no evidence in favour of the assertibility of not-S that is as strong or stronger
than the evidence in favour of S provided by C.
Here we have a strong assumption (and Casalegno is aware of it): the meaning of S and the
meaning of not-S should be grasped separately. But this seems, to him, not acceptable.
Crispin Wright’s reply to this point is more articulated that the previous. First he hi-
ghlights that the difference of assertibility-conditions between a sentence and its negation
does not imply that the construction of meaning for the negation of any given sentence va-
ries “from sentence to sentence”. He suggests that it is possible for an assertibility-condition
theorist to accept, for example, the inferentialist account for the logical operators. In this
view the uniformity of meaning would have been guaranteed by the inferential role without
the need to give up the independence between the assertibility-condition for S and those for
not-S.
The next point that Crispin Wright makes concerns the alleged judgment among all the
plausible explanations of C in (I) and the evidence for S and not-S in (II). What does exac-
tly mean, says Wright, for a person to have a better explanation for C? Similarly, how can
one person compare the relative strength of the different assertibility-conditions? This claim
seems absolutely inapplicable.
All the above represents a strong problem to the assertibility-condition thesis but this
is true only if we accept the strong assumption that “theories of meaning should explain
meaning”. “But, continues Wright, the relevant sense of explain cannot be explain ab ini-
tio”. This is the crucial point of Wright’s analysis: the only thing that we can ask to the
assertibility-condition theory is that it has to provide a description of what a person should
know to understand an expression and not to “supply the means to induce an understanding
of it”. So, Casalegno’s objections are all based on the confusion outlined above and, for this
reason, they fail to hit the target.
The second part of the talk was conducted by Timothy Willimson who explained his views
on Crispin Wright’s handout and replied to the questions posed by the audience. It would
take too long to carefully describe the debate, so we will only give a very brief outline on the
two most interesting Williamson’s critics.
The first one. Let’s recall Casalegno’s second attempt to define what the term “appro-
priate circumstances” means. Casalegno claims that it would be better to differentiate the
assertibility-conditions for S from the assertibility-conditions for not-S. In order to overco-
me Wright’s objection, Williamson thinks that we should require asseribility and deniability
conditions for S. In this way the meaning of a sentence would be defined in a stronger way.
The second point Williamson sketched out refers to Wright’s general objection to Casa-
legno. Williamson said many criticism were ascribable to Wright’s perspective on meaning.
Unfortunately, a Dummett-inspired theory of meaning shall be very different from the one
Wright has in mind. First of all, following his verificationist theory, Dummett says that we
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do need a semantic that must be decidable. Hence, Wright’s standpoint is highly problematic,
at least from a dummettian perspective, and this makes some kind of criticism to Casalegno
quite mislead.
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